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Abstract 
Kant’s account of the pain of remorse involves a hybrid justification based on self-
retribution, but constrained by forward-looking principles which say that we must channel 
remorse into improvement, and moderate its pain to avoid damaging our rational agency.  Kant’s 
corpus also offers material for a revisionist but textually-grounded alternative account based on 
wrongdoers’ sympathy for the pain they cause.  This account is based on the value of care, and 
has forward-looking constraints much like Kant’s own account.  Drawing on both Kant’s texts 
and recent work in empirical psychology, I argue that experiences of remorse which conform to 
the sympathetic account may fulfill Kant’s forward-looking goals better than those conforming 
to his own account. 
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I. Introduction 
We can react to the belief that we have acted wrongly with a variety of painful feelings, 
such as embarrassment, shame, remorse, and guilt.  However, embarrassment and shame are 
different from remorse and guilt because they can be responses to behavior which is not immoral 
but merely prompts undue attention, or anxiety about mockery, such as spilling a plate of messy 
food on oneself at a conference.  Kant comments on all these feelings, and his remarks reflect the 
intuitive distinction between them just mentioned.1   
 
1 For embarrassment [Verlegenheit], see e.g. AP 7:121, 132; for shame [Scham], see e.g. 2C 
5:88, OB 2:218. 
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The difference between remorse and guilt is somewhat complex.  “Guilt” is used both to 
refer to painful moral feeling and also to a state of culpability which can be determined by 
conscience, God, or a court, which may have painful feeling as a component, but need not.  
Courts can "find" people guilty even if they do not feel guilty.  The German word Kant uses 
which translates as “guilt” is "Schuld", which can also mean debt or obligation.  Kant seems 
rarely to write about guilty feeling, though he does so in at least one place (schuldig zu fühlen, 
RR 6:38)2.   
 
2 Abbreviations and translations for Kant’s texts are from the following books unless otherwise 
noted. “t” in passages from Kant indicates that I have altered the Cambridge translation to reflect 
my own translation.  Pagination is by Akademie edition, which is included in texts cited, unless 
otherwise noted. "NA" at the end of entries in the following list in this note indicates texts not 
included in the Akademie edition; quotes from these are paginated according to the volume cited. 
Translations from German-language volumes in this list are my own. A/B: Critique of Pure 
Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998.  2C: Critique of Practical Reason, in Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor, 
137-271. Cambridge University Press, 1996. 3C: Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul 
Guyer and Eric Matthews, ed. Paul Guyer, Cambridge University Press, 2000.  AP: 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Robert B. Louden.  In Anthropology, 
History and Education, ed. Günther Zöller and Robert B. Louden, 231-429.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007. CA: Collins notes from Kant’s Anthropology lectures in 
Lectures on Anthropology, trans. Robert B. Clewis, Robert B. Louden, G. Felicitas Munzel, and 
Allen W. Wood.  Ed. Allen W. Wood and Robert B. Louden, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012, 11-26. CO: Immanuel Kant: Correspondence, trans. and ed. Arnulf Zweig, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. CE: Collins notes from Kant’s Ethics lectures, in 
Lectures on Ethics, trans. Peter Heath, ed. Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997, 37-222. CF: The Conflict of the Faculties, trans. Mary J. 
Gregor and Robert Anchor, in Religion and Rational Theology, trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood 
and George di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 237-327. ET: The End 
of All Things, trans. Allen W. Wood, in Religion and Rational Theology, ed. Allen W. Wood and 
George di Giovanni, 221-31.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.  FA: Notes from 
Kant’s Anthropology lectures by Michael Friedländer, in Lectures on Anthropology (ibid.), 37-
255.  G: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy (ibid.), 41-108. HE: 
Notes from Kant’s Ethics lectures by J.G. Herder, in Lectures on Ethics (ibid.), 1-36. HM: Notes 
from Kant's Metaphysics lectures by J.G. Herder, in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften: Vorlesungen 
über Metaphysik und Rationaltheologie (Band 28, Erste Hälfte), ed. Gerhard Lehmann, Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1968. HN: Kant’s gesammelte Schriften: Band 19, Dritte Abtheilung: 
handschriftlicher Nachlass, Sechster Band, ed. Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 
and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 1934. LP: Lectures on Pedagogy (Kant’s own lecture notes), 
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The English word “remorse” has a helpful simplicity in its exclusive reference to painful 
moral feeling, and I will primarily rely on this term below.  With a bit of work, “remorse” can be 
directly matched up to Kant’s German terminology.  Kant uses multiple terms which translators 
render as remorse, but "Reue" and the related verb "bereuen" are by far the most common.3  
"Reue" has "rue" as a close cognate in English, and both can mean painful regret for my actions 
either because they were immoral, or because they were imprudent and brought negative 
consequences upon me.  Only the former meaning fits that of "remorse".  However, Kant draws 
distinctions which mark out a kind of Reue which fits the former meaning, which he calls 
"moralische [moral] Reue" (CE 27:353) and "wahre [true] Reue" (VE 27:464).  In the Collins 
Ethics lecture notes, Kant identifies "moralische Reue" as Reue for behavior "in regard to 
morality "[in Ansehung der Moralität]" and distinguishes it from Reue because one has acted 
"imprudently [unklug]" (CE 27:353).  Similarly, in his 1792 letter to Maria von Herbert (CO 
11:333), he distinguishes Reue over "imprudence [Unklugheit]" from Reue "grounded in a purely 
 
trans. Robert B. Louden, in Anthropology, History, and Education (ibid.), 437-85. MA: Notes 
from Kant’s Anthropology lectures by Christian Coelestin Mrongovius, in Lectures on 
Anthropology (ibid.), 335-509. MM: The Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy (ibid.), 
363-602. MT: On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy, trans. George di 
Giovanni, in Religion and Rational Theology (ibid.), 19-38.  FA: Notes from Kant’s 
Anthropology lectures by Michael Friedländer, in Lectures on Anthropology (ibid.), 261-279. 
RR: Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, trans. George di Giovanni, in Religion and 
Rational Theology, (ibid.), 39-216. RS: Review of Schulz's Attempt at an Introduction to a 
Doctrine of Morals for All Human Beings Regardless of Different Religions, in Practical 
Philosophy (ibid.), 1-10. VE: Notes from Kant’s Ethics lectures by Johann Friedrich Vigilantius 
in Lectures on Ethics, (ibid.), 249-452.  
3 Other words rendered as “remorse” and derivatives in the Cambridge translation include 
Zerknirschung (CF 7:10, 7:55), zerknirschten (3C 5:263) Kummers (VE 27:642), and Verweis 
(2C 5:38).   
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moral judgment [auf bloßer sittlicher Beurtheilung ...Verhaltens gründet]" about one's behavior.4  
I will therefore use “remorse” to translate Kant's wahre, moralische Reue.   
The main questions I wish to address in this paper are the following: what are our reasons 
for feeling remorse according to Kantian moral psychology, and how should we experience 
remorse based on those reasons?  I do not mean to claim that we typically deliberate about how 
we should experience such pain, on the basis of explicit justifications for it, or that Kant thinks 
we do.  Kant holds that we have 
an instinct [Instinkt], an involuntary and irresistible drive in our nature, which 
compels us to judge with the force of law concerning our actions, in such a way 
that it conveys to us an inner pain at evil actions[.]  (CE 27:296-7) 
 
Kant does not explain the sense in which this is instinctive, but it seems right to think that 
remorse often has an immediacy which makes it prior to deliberation about reasons for feelings.  
However, the faculty that prompts remorse is conscience, and we have a duty to cultivate 
conscience, which entails an ability to rationally shape conscience (MM 6:401).  We must be 
reflective about which actions we cause ourselves pain over, to avoid a "micrological" 
conscience "burdened with many small scruples on matters of indifference", and a "morbid 
conscience" which "seeks to impute evil in [one's] actions, when there is really no ground for it" 
 
4 The Cambridge edition often translates "Reue" as "repentance", which can evoke a theological 
context, and this context is often part of Kant's discussions, but is peripheral to my interests here.  
However, I take Kant's view to be that the emotional core of sincere repentance even in a 
theological context is remorse, and that this core can be phenomenologically and morally 
isolated from the feelings specifically about God which are also involved in repentance, such as 
fear of divine punishment.  Kant is careful to distinguish the "inner sorrow [innere Traurigkeit]" 
of "wahre [true] Reue" from the sorrow of Buße, which the Cambridge edition also translates as 
"repentance", but can also be rendered as "penance" or "penitence".  Kant remarks that "Buße" is 
"not a good not a good term; it derives from penances and chastisements [Büßungen, 
Kasteyungen]" which we inflict on ourselves when we recognize that we deserve punishment, in 
the hope that God will not punish us later (CE 27:464).  Therefore, in the following I will 
typically replace appearances of "repentance" and its derivatives in the Cambridge translation 




(CE 27:356). We must "sharpen" conscience it if it is too dull (MM 6:401), but we must not 
make it too sharp: to brood over remorse [über Reue zu brüten] can "make one's whole life 
useless by continuous self-reproach [Vorwürfe]" (CO 11:333), and an "excess of remorse 
[Kummers] over …transgressions of duty" can prompt suicide (VE 27:642).  Shaping conscience 
in these ways requires judgment about when and how we should feel remorse, and this requires 
reflection on why we should feel remorse.     
Suppose that we could alter our reactions to our own wrongs so that we felt no pain.  
Perhaps we could take pills serving the function of the "moral sedative" Kant refuses to offer his 
conscience-stricken correspondent Maria von Herbert (whose story I will return to later).  Most 
philosophers would think we ought not take such pills.  Why?  There are at least three 
independent ways of justifying the pain of remorse.  One is retributive: we should have painful 
feelings in response to past wrongful actions because we deserve them.5  Retributive 
justifications are often called backward-looking, because they refer only to past wrongs.  
Another justification is forward-looking: our wrongs should pain us because this motivates us to 
act better in the future.6  A third justification is based on the value of care: we should feel pain 
because we should care about the people we wrong, and this requires sympathizing with the pain 
 
5 For retributive justifications of remorse, see Freud 1989: 83-96; Walker 1980: 129; Murphy 
2012: 122-3, 138; Smith 2016: 356-357.  Freud is the most influential advocate of a retributive 
conception of painful moral feelings.  He conceptualizes painful moral feelings as the result of 
internalizing a vengeful parent intent on castration.  Characterized abstractly, in Freudian 
internalization, an aspect of one’s own mind comes to represent another agent, such that one’s 
own action on oneself comes to represent action on oneself by the other agent.  Kant’s model of 
conscience also involves internalization in this sense, though for Kant the internalized agent is 
God.     
6 Mill is probably the most influential advocate of a forward-looking justification of remorse: see 




our wrongs cause.7  This third justification has not been discussed as widely as the first two, but 
it does not rely on retributivism and it is not purely forward-looking, as I will explain below.  
Kant does not speak in terms of the value of care, but it is implicit in his theories of sympathy 
and friendship.  I will argue that Kant's account of our reasons for remorse is a hybrid of the 
retributive and forward-looking justifications.  I will go on to offer a revisionist but textually-
grounded care-based Kantian alternative. 
 
II. Kant's Account of Reasons for Remorse 
The most direct evidence for a retributive component in remorse appears in Kant's 
discussion of our negative duty to promote others' "moral well-being": 
[T]he pain one feels from the pangs of conscience [Der Schmerz, den ein Mensch 
von Gewissensbissen fühlt] has a moral source…To see to it that another does not 
deservedly [verdienterweise] suffer this inner reproach [innere Vorwurf] is not my 
duty but his affair; but it is my duty to refrain from doing anything that, 
considering the nature of a human being, could tempt him to do something for 
which his conscience could afterwards torturet him [ihn sein Gewissen nachher 
peinigen kann][.] (MM 6:394) 
 
This seems to imply the general view that to experience pain from the pangs of conscience—in 
other words, to suffer remorse—is to deservedly suffer inner reproach.8   
 
7 A sympathy-based justification of remorse is discussed in Pereboom 2014: 186-7. 
8 Kant's account of remorse has received little discussion in the literature.  It has been discussed 
indirectly in relation to Kant's account of conscience, by way of a question about whether 
conscience punishes, in the context of a critique of Thomas Hill’s interpretation by Allen Wood.  
Hill holds that conscience punishes, while Wood holds that conscience does not punish (Hill 
2002: 301, 352-3; Wood 2008: 187-8).  Wood rightly highlights passages in which Kant 
criticizes penitent self-torture (e.g. MM 6:485, CE 27:464, CF 7:55-6).  However, close analysis 
shows that what Kant is criticizing is the penitence of Buße, which Kant thinks is founded in 
Reue over imprudence, rather than the self-retribution of wahre, moralische Reue.  See note 4 
above.  I discuss this issue in more detail in [author’s paper 1, under review].  There is a passage 
which neither cites which supports Hill’s interpretation, at MT 8:260, where Kant describes the 
conscientiousness of the virtuous man as “a conscientiousness [Gewissenhaftigkeit] in all its 
severity which, the more virtuous a human being is, all the more harshly punishes [bestraft] him 
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 Elsewhere Kant indicates that forward-looking considerations play a role in justifying 
remorse, because it motivates us to improve, by acting better in general and by making amends 
to the people we have wronged.  The "monkish ascetics" passage discussed earlier states that 
moralische zu bereuen requires a "view to improving" (MM 6:485).  In the Religion, Kant 
criticizes "remorseful self-inflicted torments [reuige Selbstpeinigungen] that do not…originate in 
any genuine disposition toward improvement" (RR 6:77), and argues that at the end of life 
"conscience ought rather to be stirred up and sharpened, in order that whatever good yet to be 
done, or whatever consequences of past evil still left to be undone (repaired for), will not be 
neglected" (RR 6:77n).  The Anthropology warns against regarding our "record of guilt 
as…simply wiped out (through remorset [Reue]), so that [we are] spared the effort toward 
improvement" (AP 7:236).   
Kant sometimes suggests such a complete reliance on forward-looking reasons that he 
can seem to advocate a purely forward-looking account, such that the only reasons to feel 
remorse are forward-looking.  In the Mrongovius Anthropology lecture notes (1784-5), Kant 
critiques "idle desires, pia desideria" connected with the "wish that something would not have 
happened which, however, now is impossible", which is "senseless and harmful" and leads to 
"distraction".  He gives "remorse [Reue]" as an example of such desires, and says that it "is good 
merely insofar as it impels us to cancel the consequences thereof and to act better in the sequel" 
(MA 25:1335, my boldface).  His point here seems to be that when we feel remorse, we should 
try to eliminate painful thoughts connected with the wish that we had not acted badly and focus 
 
because of the slightest indiscretion frowned upon by the moral law in him.”  We should assume 
that virtuous people have consciences which function properly, so if their consciences punish, 
then proper function of conscience is to punish.  However, this point does not give us a 
fundamental justification of the pain of remorse which conscience inflicts, because punishment 
itself requires further justification. 
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on acting better in the future.  But retributive justifications of remorse essentially involve 
references to past wrongs, and so the MA 25:1335 remarks suggest that there is no role for 
retributivism.   
 Some philosophers think of Kant as aiming to oppose consequentialist reasoning in all 
things, and may thus resist the notion that Kant endorses forward-looking reasons for remorse.  
But the notion of doing ethics without any forward-looking reasoning is surely absurd—the key 
idea for Kant is that forward-looking reasoning is not always the right way to think about moral 
matters, and must always be regulated by duties to persons as ends which constrain forward-
looking reasoning.9  Forward-looking reasoning is crucial for Kant in contexts as varied as 
punishment by the state (MM 6:331, 6:336; CE 27:286), education (2C 5:152; LP 9:451-2), and 
the prudent permissible pursuit of happiness (G 4:399; 2C 5:25).  So forward-looking reasons in 
the justification of remorse need not conflict with Kantian non-consequentialism.   
On the other hand, a purely forward-looking justification of remorse conflicts with deep 
intuitions about the significance of painful moral emotions which it is natural for Kantians to 
wish to preserve.  Suppose that I am imprisoned in solitary confinement for a series of assaults 
that left my victims disabled and in pain, and I am certain to die before I am released, and the 
conditions of my imprisonment mean I can do nothing to make amends to my victims or improve 
my behavior toward people in general.  I might conclude that I have no forward-looking reasons 
for remorse, and if these are the only reasons for remorse I endorse, it would be rational to make 
an effort to free myself from remorse altogether.  Utilitarians need not object to this effort, but 
 
9 I am not claiming that duties to persons as ends can be fully explained in terms of the 
forward/backward dichotomy, and I do not think retributivism is necessary to account for such 
duties, but I lack space to address this matter in detail. 
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Kantians may regard it as trivialization of wrongdoing which privileges my happiness over my 
appreciation of the gravity of my wrongs. 
There are, however, remarks which suggest Kant has a hybrid theory with both 
retributivist and forward-looking components.  In Kant's critique of Johann Schulz's moral 
theory, Kant attributes various theses to Schulz which Kant does not accept.  One of is that 
"Remorse [Reue] is merely a misunderstood representation of how one could act better in the 
future, and in fact nature has no other purpose in it than the end of improvement" (RS 8:110).  
This suggests that Kant thinks remorse has another purpose in addition to improvement, and MM 
6:394 (quoted above) suggests this is retribution.  This idea is also supported by Herder's 
Metaphysics notes, which state that "[i]f remorse [Reue] about the past prevents all attention to 
the future, it is absurd" (HM 28:90).  This suggests that remorse is not absurd if it looks 
backward and forward.  Another text supporting a hybrid theory appears in the Collins Ethics 
lecture notes, which state that preachers attending the dying "must…see to it, that people do 
indeed feel remorset for [bereuen] the transgression of self-regarding duties, since these can no 
longer be remedied, but that if they have wronged another, they genuinely try to make amends" 
(CE 27:354).  Kant’s death-bed case partly overlaps with the solitary confinement case sketched 
above, in that Kant thinks the imminence of death means that there is a forward-looking way to 
respond to some but not all of one's past bad actions.  He states that we should feel remorse for 
the actions to which we cannot respond in a forward-looking way, and MM 6:394 makes it 
reasonable to assume we should feel such remorse simply because we deserve it.   
Overall, the evidence surveyed means that we should attribute the following view to 
Kant.  We must retributively inflict remorse on ourselves for past wrongs, under two forward-
looking constraints: (1) remorse should be channeled into improved behavior when possible, so 
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that it prompts us to act more morally toward others in general and to make amends to the 
particular people we have wronged; (2) remorse must be moderated insofar as that is necessary 
to go on with our lives as effective moral agents.  We have seen this in Kant's warnings that 
remorse can lead to distraction, brooding which makes life useless, and even suicide.   
 
III. Concerns about Self-Retribution 
In this section I will explain two concerns about the retributive component of Kant's 
account.  The first concern is about the epistemology of transcendental freedom and its 
implications for retribution.  It is based on a critique of Kant which I can only sketch here, 
though I provide detailed arguments for it elsewhere.10  We have a strong intuition that 
justifications for retribution must meet the highest possible practical justificatory standard, since 
retribution is about the intentional infliction of harm which is purportedly deserved even if it has 
no forward-looking justification.  This intuition is part of why so many endorse the view that 
arguments in the criminal court must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.11  Kant himself 
addresses this intuition in a discussion of imputation [Imputation] of crimes in the Vigilantius 
Ethics notes (VE 27:558-27:573).  “Imputation” is Kant’s term for assigning moral responsibility 
for actions, so imputation is a precondition for judgments about desert, and thus for retributive 
justification.  He describes the justificatory standard we must meet in imputing crimes as "the 
greatest possiblet [größtmöglichste] moral and logical certainty [Gewißheit]", and states that it 
extends not only to questions of whether the deed to be imputed was actually done by the agent 
at issue (whether "the man did it" (VE 27:567)) and the nature of the “motive to the action” (VE 
 
10 Author's paper 2, in print. 
11 Pereboom 2006 points out the significance of this intuition for Kant’s account of 
transcendental freedom, though not in the context of remorse. 
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27:559), but also that it is “absolutely necessary in addition, that he act with freedom, indeed it is 
only when considered as a free being that he can be accountable” (ibid.).  This standard of 
greatest possible logical and moral certainty is relevant not only for the courts constructed in our 
legal institutions, but also for conscience, because Kant thinks of conscience itself as a kind of 
court which adjudicates “the internal imputation of a deed” (MM 6:438). 
There is reason to doubt that this highest possible justificatory standard can really be met 
in Kantian ethics.  While Kant does not specify at VE 27:559 that the certainty we require about 
agents’ freedom is certainty about transcendental freedom, I take that to be the default 
interpretation.  I take it to be Kant’s view that we can only deserve to suffer if we have the 
radical independence from natural causation which transcendental freedom affords.  I think he is 
right to think this.  But the first Critique’s argument that we cannot have theoretical knowledge 
of transcendental freedom entails that we cannot meet this standard through theoretical 
reasoning.  Kant of course advocates a practical epistemology of transcendental freedom in the 
second Critique and afterwards which he thinks delivers practical knowledge that we are 
transcendentally free, and he seems to think we meet the standard of certainty for retribution in 
this way.  In his practical epistemology, he appeals to the "ought implies can" principle to argue 
from the claim that we know we ought to act in certain ways to the claim that we know we can 
act in those ways, which he claims to entail practical certainty that we are transcendentally free 
(see e.g. 2C 5:30).  Kant may mean to assert this supposed knowledge as an ungrounded or self-
grounding "fact of pure reason" (2C 5:31).  He may also think it has a kind of phenomenological 
grounding in our moral feelings, and in respect for moral law in particular, which he thinks we 
should represent as determined in us through moral law with a self-wrought spontaneity 
fundamentally distinct from causation according to natural law.  But he acknowledges that "this 
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determination has exactly the same inward effect, that of an impulse to activity”, as sensible 
incentives which have no such special origin (2C 5:116), so it unclear how the phenomenology 
can play a grounding role.  It seems fair to claim that Kant’s theoretical argument against 
knowledge that we are transcendentally free makes it prudent to be cautious about being easily 
persuaded by his practical argument in favor of such knowledge.  The fact that retributivism 
relies crucially on transcendental freedom, and that justifications for retribution demand the 
highest possible justificatory standard, imply that if we have doubts about Kant’s practical 
epistemology in any context, we should take those doubts most seriously in the context of 
justifications for retribution.  I think that Kant’s practical epistemology, in combination with his 
argument that it is possible that we are transcendentally free in the first Critique, give us ample 
space for a postulate that we are transcendentally free.12  But to postulate is not to know, and 
without knowledge, we cannot meet the justificatory standard retribution requires.  We cannot 
justly inflict suffering on people by postulating that they deserve to suffer.     
It may be objected that the entire edifice of Kantian ethics collapses if we put practical 
knowledge of transcendental freedom in doubt in the context of retribution, but I think this is a 
mistake.  A postulate of transcendental freedom is sufficient for regarding ourselves “under the 
idea of freedom” and bound by moral law, and I think Kant’s argument that we must regard 
ourselves in this way when we deliberate about how to act in Groundwork III has merit, because 
it is plausible that deliberation requires us to postulate that we have the kind of control afforded 
by transcendental freedom over the alternative courses of action among which we deliberate.13  
 
12Kant himself of course assigns this status to the belief in transcendental freedom at 2C 5:132, 
though it is not clear whether this is an alternative way he sometimes thought about this belief or 
a slip of the pen.     




But when we make judgments about whether to impute actions to human beings, ourselves and 
others, there are both prospective and retrospective elements to consider: we deliberate about 
alternative ways we can act with respect to a completed action which now presents itself as an 
object for judgment.  There is a kind of flexibility available to us in deciding what it means to 
regard completed actions under the idea of freedom, which justice requires us to take seriously.  
Kant holds that "a person is a subject whose actions can be imputed to him" (MM 6:223), but his 
doctrine of degrees of imputation (ME 6:228; CE 27:291; VE 27:567) implies that we can assign 
responsibility in different degrees in different cases.  Herder’s Metaphysics notes suggest that the 
appropriate degree of imputation is sometimes “vanishingly small” (HM 28:41).  I think these 
points imply that we can allow the (as it were) local diminution of degrees of imputation in cases 
where we confront especially high justificatory standards for imputation, and when we confront 
the highest possible justificatory standard, as we do in justifications for retribution, we should 
accordingly diminish the degree of imputation, so that the role which is played by retribution in 
justifying suffering diminishes in a corresponding way.  We can still impute actions to agents, as 
wrongs rather than mere effects of things, but we can do so in a degree appropriate to the 
requisite standard of justification.  Kant himself does not draw on his doctrine of degrees of 
imputation in this way.  He thinks, for example, that the state must punish retributively according 
to the lex talionis, which he thinks entails a “principle of equality” commanding execution of 
murderers and enslavement of thieves (MM 6:333).  But Kantians can adopt this approach 
without fear of undermining Kantian ethics as a whole. 
Now I will turn to a second concern about the retributive component of Kant's account, 
which is practical rather than metaphysical or epistemological.  That is, self-retribution appears 
to be responsible for many of the practical hazards of remorse.  As discussed above, we are 
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meant to channel remorse into improvement.  Distraction, brooding which makes life useless, 
and suicide are all obviously things which obstruct improvement, and these would all seem to 
follow naturally from the belief that we deserve to suffer.  If inflicting suffering on ourselves 
because we believe we deserve it has a value independent from the value of treating people better 
in general and making amends, then it makes sense to attend to inflicting that suffering in a way 
that is independent of the attention we invest in acting better, and given the finitude of attention, 
this inevitably distracts us from acting better.  Protracted distraction results in brooding.  Further, 
if one "connects the transgression or violation of his conscience with the idea of losing his entire 
moral worth" (VE 27:575), as Kant claims, there is a kind of tragic rationality in thinking that 
blotting oneself out through suicide is appropriate self-retribution, though this violates duty and 
permanently forecloses the possibility of improvement.  This tragic rationality may explain 
Kant’s distressing remark that suicide from excess remorse is not a "crude" kind of suicide 
"which should be an object of general hatred", but is rather a suicide which "could betray a worth 
of the soul", like suicide for "the conservation of [one's] honour" (VE 27:642). 
The idea that excess remorse can lead to suicide is borne out in contemporary clinical 
psychology.  The most widely-referenced text in clinical psychology, the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), uses the term "guilt" to refer just to feeling, 
independent of the associations with the legal culpability one may have even if one does not feel 
guilty noted earlier, and it thus uses "guilt" in a way I take to be coreferential with "remorse" as 
used here.  It lists "[f]eelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt" among the 
diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder, in which "suicidal ideation" and "suicide 
attempts" are common (American Psychological Association, 2013, 160-164).  The degree to 
which the pain at issue in the DSM is principally motivated by a desire for self-retribution is an 
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empirical question with which psychology is still grappling, but there is good reason to think that 
many psychologists have seen it this way, given the influence of the Freudian idea that guilt is 
essentially a matter of exacting vengeance upon ourselves.  
We may also have an example of suicide motivated by self-retribution in Kant's own 
correspondent Maria von Herbert.  In a 1791 letter to Kant, she writes that a man she loved had 
fallen out of love with her when she revealed a protracted but harmless lie, apparently connected 
with the fact that she had had a previously relationship.  She asks Kant for "solace, or for counsel 
to prepare [her] for death", proceeding to make it clear that she meant she was contemplating 
suicide (CO 11:273-4).  Kant writes back in 1792 encouraging her not to kill herself, counseling 
"composure", and remarking that "life, insofar as it is cherished for the good that we can do, 
deserves the highest respect and the greatest solicitude in preserving it and cheerfully using it for 
good ends" (CO 11:334).  But he refuses to provide a "moral sedative": he tells her that even a 
harmless lie is "a serious violation of duty to oneself and one for which there can be no 
remission", and (as mentioned earlier) instructs that her "bitter self-reproach" for her lie should 
not be Reue over "imprudence [Unklugheit]" but Reue "grounded in a purely moral judgment 
[auf bloßer sittlicher Beurtheilung ...Verhaltens gründet]" of her behavior (CO 11:331-3).  He 
notes that “self-torture [Selbstpeinigung]” is not “deserved [verdienstlicher]” if one is “sure of 
having reformed”, but von Herbert clearly had read Kant’s work in enough detail to be familiar 
with his skepticism about ever really being sure about how pure one’s disposition is (G 4:407, 
MM 6:392-3).14  She committed suicide in 1803.  It is impossible to know how great a role self-
retribution played in her death, but the texts make it reasonable to worry that it played some role. 
 
14 Ware 2009 argues that the role of God’s judgment in conscience resolves this concern.  In 
[author’s paper 1, under review] I argue that this resolution is unstable because the God of 




IV. A Sympathy-Based Kantian Account of Reasons for Remorse 
The non-retributive proposal turns on the idea that we ought to sympathize with the pain 
our wrongs cause.  First, I will explain how it works in a general way, and next, how it can be 
grounded in Kant’s texts.   
It is in the nature of care that when I care about someone, I sympathize with her joy and 
also her pain.  When I care about someone (for example, because I have befriended her) I 
sympathize with her pain not because by establishing a connection of care I have made it the 
case that I deserve to suffer when she does, but because sympathy is part of caring.  It would be 
absurd to suppose that by befriending someone, I have gotten myself into a situation such that I 
deserve to suffer when she does—rather, we think that sympathetic suffering is part of the nature 
of friendship, because it is part of the nature of care.  
When I have wronged someone I care about, and caused them pain, I may well believe 
that I deserve to suffer, and it may seem to be a matter of everyday moral common sense that I 
ought to believe that I deserve to suffer.  But even if I am skeptical about the notion that anyone 
can deserve to suffer (perhaps because the first Critique places it in doubt, and perhaps for 
independent moral reasons) the fact that someone I care about is in pain gives me a reason to be 
pained.  Sympathetic pain gives us a reason to remove the cause of the other's pain, and when the 
cause is our own actions, it gives us a reason to be pained by those actions, and to improve, both 
by acting better in general, and by making amends.  Grounding the value of sympathy in the 
value of care means this is not just a hedonistic calculus: if sympathy is a manifestation of care, 
then guidance by sympathy is guidance by care.  This grounding also steers us away from the 
utilitarian thought that we should sympathize equally with everyone, so that we are motivated to 
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maximize overall happiness.  Once we dispense with the utilitarian construal of care, it is 
intuitive to think that the value of care gives us reasons to care about everyone to some degree, 
but to care in a focused and heightened way about some particular others, such as our friends.   
Sungwoo Um (2020) calls this focused aspect of care "particularized care". 
The key idea in the sympathetic justification of remorse is that we should have such 
particularized care for the people we have wronged—that wronging people gives us a reason to 
care about them which is virtuous in a way that parallels the virtuousness of making friends, and 
which is independent of reasons of desert.15  Certainly perfectly virtuous agents like the Kantian 
sage would never wrong people in the first place, but a theory of remorse is necessarily a theory 
that applies to imperfectly virtuous agents.   The idea is that in wronging another, the wrongdoer 
establishes a particular moral connection with the person wronged which demands care in a way 
which is not grounded on desert.  Human nature as it is empirically given to us is such that when 
someone hurts us in a way that violates morality, we have a desire for the wrongdoer not only to 
make amends, but also to understand what he has done in a way that is not just cognitive but also 
involves painful emotions.  This desire is often strong enough to constitute the kind of 
disposition Kant calls a need [Bedürfniß].  Some philosophers may wish to model such needs in 
terms of Strawsonian reactive attitudes, which can be understood as essentially involving desires 
for the wrongdoer to experience deserved suffering.  But it artificially circumscribes such needs 
to assume that they are always retributive.  Wrongdoers’ sympathetic pain sometimes satisfies 
such needs, and since sympathetic pain does not have to be understood in terms of deserved 
suffering, such needs do not always have to be understood as retributive.  
 
15 I set out this view in a way that is independent of Kantian ethics in [author’s paper 4, in print].  
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While remorse based on sympathy gives us forward-looking reasons, the sympathetic 
justification cannot be reduced to a forward-looking justification, because care is not valuable 
just because of its consequences.  Care as understood here entails sympathizing with suffering 
even when there is nothing we can do to help.  If I am trapped on a desert island and receive a 
message in a bottle informing me that someone I claim to care about is suffering, and I do not 
suffer sympathetically just because I cannot help, this is a strong indication that my claim to care 
is false.  The same thing holds when we care about people we have wronged—sympathy 
motivates us to make amends if we can, but if we cannot, we still sympathize, because we care.  
Kant does not talk about the value of care in terms that lend themselves to easy linkage 
with contemporary care ethics.16  However, his accounts of sympathy and friendship have some 
parallel implications. We can draw ideas from these accounts to develop a Kantian account of 
sympathetic remorse which is revisionist but textually grounded.  Kant's best-known remarks on 
sympathy appear in the Groundwork, and can appear to reject any role for sympathy in his moral 
psychology (G 4:398-9).  He says that while sympathy is “amiable” and a disposition to be 
encouraged, it is “on the same footing with other inclinations”, and we can have a “far higher 
worth than what a mere good-natured temperament” confers “even if we are cold and indifferent 
to the sufferings of others” (G 4:398).  But in Kant’s more detailed account of sympathy in the 
Metaphysics of Morals, he explains that "Sympathetic Feeling is Generally a Duty 
[Theilnehmende Empfindung ist uberhaupt Pflicht]" (MM 6:456), and that "it is a duty [Pflicht] 
to actively sympathize [thätige Theilnehmung] in [others'] fate" (MM 6:457).  If it is a duty to 
sympathize, then sympathy cannot be merely a matter of inclination—it must count as a moral 
feeling and must be capable of guidance by practical reason.  The apparent conflict between the 
 
16 Others who have discussed Kant and care include Halpern (2001:101-127), Wood (2008: 176-
7), and Paytas (2015). 
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Groundwork and the Metaphysics of Morals arises from the Groundwork’s elision of a 
distinction between two ways of sympathizing which can involve qualitatively identical 
sympathetic joys and pains but differ in their relation to practical rationality.  One is a passive, 
inclination-driven sympathy, which I will refer to as "natural sympathy", and the other is an 
active (thätige) sympathy guided by practical reason, which I will refer to as "rational 
sympathy".  Kant draws this distinction in at least five places over a period of at least 20 years. 
To keep things concise, I will label the terms for rational sympathy with “(a)” and the terms for 
natural sympathy with “(b)”.  MM 6:456 distinguishes (a) “humanitas practica”, the “capacity 
and the will to share in others’ feelings”, which is “free”, and based on “practical reason” and (b) 
“humanitas aesthetica”, “the receptivity, given by nature itself, to the feeling of joy and sadness 
in common with others”, which “can be called communicable…like receptivity to warmth or 
contagious [ansteckender] diseases…since it spreads naturally”.  FA 25:607-11 distinguishes (a) 
“reason’s sympathy” and (b) “physical sympathy”.  AP 7:235 and MA 25:1320-1 distinguish (a) 
“sensitivity” (Empfindsamkeit) and (b) “sentimentality” (Empfindelei).  Sensitivity "possesses 
choice" and "permits or prevents both the state of pleasure as well as displeasure from entering 
the mind" in a way that allows us to "judge [others'] sensation, while sentimentality “is a 
weakness by which we can be affected, even against our will, by sympathy (Theilnehmung) for 
others’ condition who…play at will on the organ of the sentimentalist” (AP 7:235).  VE 27:677-8 
distinguishes (a) “moral” sympathy and (b) “instinctual” sympathy.  These discussions all 
support a distinction between (a) sympathy which is voluntary and guided by reason, and (b) 
sympathy which is passive and irrational.  In (a) the feelings are regulated so that they do not rise 
to “affects”, feelings which interfere with self-governance and can (for example) prevent us from 
helping effectively even when we discover means to do so (FA 25:589, MM 6:407), and dispose 
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us to violations of the law when they conflict with duty (RR 6:30 and FA 25:611).  In (b) the 
agent allows feelings to flow passively, without exercising the discipline necessary for (a)-type 
sympathy.17   
Sympathy is an activity of the imagination (MM 6:321n, 6:457; AP 7:179, 7:238), and 
the difference between rational and natural sympathy is a difference between active and passive 
ways in which this activity can proceed.  Imagination is a fundamental power in Kant’s theory of 
mind, one of two “parts” of sensibility, the other of which is “sense” (AP 7:153).  Sympathy is 
best understood as an activity of the a posteriori productive imagination, which can function 
both involuntarily and voluntarily (AP 7:174; MA 25:1257).  Kant calls involuntary productive 
imagination “fantasy” (Phantasie) (AP 7:167, 7:175, also see MA 25:1258, M 29:884-5), and 
makes an explicit connection between Phantasie and Empfindelei (sentimentality) at 3C 5:273, 
which I argued above is a term for natural sympathy.  Kant contrasts fantasy with a voluntary, 
rationally-ordered counterpart called “disciplined fantasy <phantasia subacta>” at M 29:885.  
This suggests that natural sympathy is an aspect of involuntary productive imagination, and 
rational sympathy is an aspect of voluntary productive imagination.   
Kant says that the sympathetic imagination puts us “in the other’s place” (FA 25:575, 
also see MM 6:321n; HE 27:58, 27:65; FA 25:575, 25:607, for similar language).18  The 
voluntary exercise of this capacity, which we might call projective imagination, is a skill which 
enables rational sympathy: 
the power to transpose the I is necessary, and to put oneself in the point of view 
and place of the other, so that one thinks with him, and has sympathy with him t 
(sich in ihm fühlt)…To take a point of view is a skill (Geschicklichkeit) which one 
can acquire by practice (sich durch Uebung erwerben kann).  
 
17 I give this exegesis in more detail in [author’s papers 5 and 6 (in print) and 7 (under review)].  
18 Timmermann (unpublished book manuscript) discusses the idea that imagination puts us in the 
other’s place, but does not see this as a necessary condition of adopting others’ ends. 
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(FA 25:475, also see 25:606-7) 
 
Kant thinks the sympathy this enables is very vivid: “we really feel ourselves to be in his place” 
(HE 27:58), and “[w]e are sensible of this sympathizing feeling in our entire soul” (FA 25:606).   
Natural sympathy happens when this occurs involuntarily.  We draw on the skill of projective 
imagination when we sympathize not only with actual others, but also with possible others.  In 
the Friedländer Anthropology notes, Kant says that “[w]hen we read something, a history or a 
novel, we always put ourselves in the other’s place and this is sympathyt (Theilnehmung)” (FA 
25:476).  
Kant’s distinction between rational sympathy, on the one hand, and episodes of natural 
sympathy which prompt agency-disrupting affect, on the other, corresponds closely (and is 
plausibly identical) to a distinction drawn in contemporary empirical psychology between 
empathic concern and empathic distress (Tangney 1991: 599).  Empathic concern involves 
“feelings of compassion and warmth felt for the target of empathy” (Hodges et al., 2007: 390). It 
is an “intentional capacity” which involves “emotion-regulation”— it “involves an explicit 
representation of the subjectivity of the other” rather than “a simple resonance of affect between 
the self and other” (Decety et al., 2007: 254).  Empathic distress, by contrast, is a feeling which 
Decety et al. (2007: 254) call “emotional contagion”.  Hodges et al. (2007: 402) say that it 
“occurs when people fail to rein in emotional empathy”, and note that “[t]he quintessential 
example of this phenomenon is the bystander who witnesses a gruesome accident and can only 
stand by, gasping and shrieking, rather than comforting the victim or going for help”.  
Psychologists think that it is the development of regulatory processes which allows us to feel 
empathic concern rather than empathic distress.  It appears that some of this regulation is 
unconscious, but there is evidence that conscious perspective-taking plays a role in this 
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regulation too.  To “imagine things from the empathy target’s point of view consistently 
increases empathic concern” (Hodges et al., 2007: 393; also see Batson et al., 1997).  On the 
other hand, imagining things from the other’s perspective too vividly can prompt empathic 
distress, and we can modify how we frame our engagement with the other’s position to moderate 
our empathic feelings (Hodges et al., 2007: 393).  
Universalizing our maxims might seem to require us to sympathize equally with 
everyone, and this might prohibit us from cultivating especially strong sympathy for particular 
others.  But Kant does not advocate this.  We have a duty of friendship (MM 6:469), and while 
we ought to have "general good will toward everyone", "to be everybody's friend will not do, for 
he who is a friend to all has no particular friend; but friendship is a particular bond" (CE 
27:430).19  Friendship is an “ideal of each sympathizing and communicating t [Ideal der 
Theilnehmung und Mittheilung] about  the other's wellbeing” which guides us toward a 
“maximum” (MM 6:469) in which “each mutually sympathizest (teilnehmen) with every 
situation of the other, as if it were encountered by himself” (VE 27:677).  This ideal gives us 
reasons to establish strong particularized sympathetic bonds with our friends.  I think this is a 
manifestation in Kant's ethics of the value of particularized care.   
My claim is that we ought to care about the people we have wronged in this way too.  
Kant nearly suggests this account of remorse in a discussion of sympathy and the “oppression” 
of people “subordinate to the aristocracy” (FA 25:606).  Kant says that “a humble person can 
easily put himself in the position of the higher one and assume greater dispositions.  However, 
the distinguished one cannot assume the state of the humble one, hence he also does not 
sympathize [sympathesirt] with his misfortune” (FA 25:607).  “If the ills are natural, for 
 
19 See Baron and Fahmy (2009: 222) for a discussion of this point. 
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example, famine, then the distinguished person sympathizes with the humble one just as well as 
the latter with him, but in the case of…ideal ills, the distinguished one does not sympathize 
[sympathesirt] with the humble one, but the latter does in fact sympathize [sympathesirt] with the 
former” (FA 25:606-7).  The distinguished one “thinks that the one who is thus not accustomed 
to the refined life is indeed just a humble man, hence he always gets on [in life], if he can just 
live”, and does “not become as aware” of the “distance” of the humble man’s “social standing 
from the civic one in general” (FA 25:607).  Kant says that while a commoner “has compassion 
(Mitleiden) for an unfortunate king”, the “unfortunate thing with kings” is that they “have no 
inclination” to “imagine the misfortune of their subjects” (FA 25:607).  Kant’s implicit point 
here is that when the “distinguished” sympathize naturally, their inclinations may dispose them 
to imagine what it is like for the “humble” to be hungry or in pain, but not to imagine their 
“ideal” misfortunes—in particular, they do not imagine that the “humble” have ideas of 
happiness which include more than just living, and are pained by the way their social standing 
makes it hard to do more than just live—and that the “distinguished” should resist their 
inclinations, and sympathize rationally, putting themselves in the place of the “humble” more 
accurately in a way that brings them a greater range of sympathetic feelings, including 
sympathetic pain.  An intuitive next step in this line of thought would be for the “distinguished” 
to note that since it is their own oppressive behavior which is the cause of what is wrong in the 
lives of the “humble”, they can alleviate that pain by making amends to particular people they 
have wronged and improve their behavior generally so as to not contribute to future oppression.  
This next step would establish the basic operations of the sympathetic Kantian remorse I am 
advocating here.   
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I argued earlier that suffering in sympathy with people we care about is valuable even 
when we cannot help, and I think this means that a sympathy-based Kantian theory of remorse, 
like Kant's own theory, is not purely forward-looking.  As explained earlier, this is crucial 
because a purely forward-looking conception of remorse can strike Kantian sensibilities as 
trivializing some grave wrongs.  I think Kant himself is committed to the view that sympathetic 
suffering is valuable even apart from its good consequences, but there is a textual challenge to 
this claim which must be addressed.  The apparent endorsement of cold indifference we saw in 
the Groundwork recurs within Kant's theory of friendship, and appears to undercut the claim that 
sympathetic suffering is valuable when it has no good consequences.  Kant writes that when the 
sage “could not rescue his friend, [he] said to himself ‘what is it to me?’ In other words, he 
rejected compassion [Mitleidenschaft]” (MM 6:457).  Kant continues in a way that seems to 
endorse the attitude of the sage: 
In fact, when another suffers and, although I cannot help him, I let myself be 
infected [anstecken] by his pain (through my imagination), then two of us suffer, 
though the trouble really (in nature) affects only one.  But there cannot possibly 
be a duty to increase the ills in the world and so to do good from compassion 
[Mitleid].  (MM 6:457) 
     
On initial inspection, it may be natural to read Kant here as arguing quite precisely that there is 
no reason for painful sympathy when we lack forward-looking reasons.  But there is good reason 
to think that what Kant is criticizing here is painful natural sympathy, because in objecting to 
letting oneself "be infected [anstecken]" by another's pain, he uses the same word he uses to 
describe humanitas aesthetica just two paragraphs earlier (in a passage mentioned above), and 
humanitas aesthetica is a term for natural sympathy.  This makes it reasonable to think that Kant 
is not claiming that rational sympathy is only valuable when it has good consequences.20   
 
20 I make this argument in more detail in [author’s paper 7, under review].  Also see Denis 2000.  
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Further, I think that fundamental features of Kant’s intentional teleology commit him to 
the view that sympathetic suffering is valuable even when it has no good consequences, because 
sympathy is necessary to fulfill the imperfect duty to make others’ permissible ends “as far as 
possible…also my ends” (G 4:430).  This implies that the duty of sympathy is grounded in the 
duty to make others’ permissible ends my own.21  The argument for this view turns on a 
distinction between adopting and promoting others’ ends.22  Many of others' permissible ends are 
subjective ends, that is, ends which they have only because of features of their individual 
feelings which are contingent from the perspective of rational agency (G 4:427).  Rational 
sympathy allows me to project myself into others’ perspectives and conform contingent features 
of my own sensibility to theirs, and this disposes me to be sympathetically pleased when they 
achieve their ends and pained when they do not, and thus disposes me to work toward the 
achievement of their ends out of motivation from a contingent feeling-basis like their own.  This 
allows me not only to promote but also adopt their ends.  I can promote others' ends without 
sympathizing if I do so as means to distinct ends—that is, I may behave in ways which help 
others achieve their ends even if I am in pursuit of ends which are not their ends.  If my friend 
wants to alleviate his pangs of hunger, I may give him food because the sounds he makes in 
eating produce an auto meridian sensory response in me, or because I desire to improve my 
reputation, or because I have a rational desire to fulfill my duty of beneficence.  While I promote 
his end in all these ways, and there may be no difference at all in the consequences I produce, I 
do so as means to ends which are not his end (see MM 6:388 for an argument which supports 
 
21 I make this argument in detail in [author’s paper 6, in print].  
22 Fahmy (2010: 314-27) also draws on the distinction between adopting and promoting others’ 
ends, but interprets it differently. 
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this claim).  To dispense with sympathetic pain for others who are in pain is to dispense with 
adoption of their ends, and thereby to fail to take their ends as my own in an important way.  
This shows that Kant's moral psychology offers materials for a sympathy-based account 
of remorse which does not rely on desert, and is therefore not vulnerable to the epistemological 
and metaphysical problems confronting retribution.  This account’s grounding in the value of 
care arguably allows it to satisfy Kant’s forward-looking requirements for remorse better than his 
own account. As explained above, the first forward-looking requirement is that remorse should 
be channeled into improved behavior.  It is prima facie plausible to suppose that sympathetic 
remorse would fulfill this goal better than self-retributive remorse.  If I am hurting because I 
believe that someone I care about is in pain, it is clear what I must do: I must help her.  There is 
also empirical evidence that rationally sympathetic remorse would prompt such behavior: as 
noted earlier, rational sympathy is similar (and plausibly identical) to what is called “empathic 
concern” in contemporary empirical psychology, and empathic concern is associated with 
“altruistic helping behavior” toward the people with whom we empathize (Tangney 1991: 599; 
also see Hodges et al., 2007: 402).  If I am hurting because I believe I deserve to suffer, there is 
more conceptual and psychological mediation required to arrive at the motivation to help.   
Kant’s second forward-looking requirement is that remorse must be moderated to avoid 
distraction, brooding, and suicide, so that we can remain effective moral agents.  Earlier we 
noted reasons to think that self-retributive remorse may pose special hazards here, and it is 
intuitive to think that rationally sympathetic remorse would pose fewer hazards.  This claim also 
finds support in contemporary empirical psychology.  Earlier we saw that excess guilt (arguably 
construed on a self-retributive model) is a diagnostic criterion for depression, and that depression 
can prompt suicide.  Empathic feelings are also common in depression, but the distinction 
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between empathic concern and empathic distress (which is similar and plausibly identical to the 
distinction between rational and natural sympathy) is crucial in understanding the relationship 
between empathy and depression.  Ghorbani et al. give evidence that, while empathic distress is 
positively correlated with depression, empathic concern is negatively correlated with depression 
(2003: 438).  O’Connor et al. explain that “[the] empathic reaction in depressives often leads to 
great distress because they tend to unrealistically blame themselves for pain felt by others” 
(2007: 49), and use an explicitly retributive model of self-blame, describing “self punishment” in 
depression as “meted out…while thinking ‘I deserve this’ ” (ibid., 67).  They argue that it is just 
this unwarranted self-retribution which “transform[s] empathic concern into empathic distress” 
in the case of depression, and therefore advocate depression therapy which targets unwarranted 
self-retribution (ibid., 70).  According to the view I advance, we ought to resist self-retribution, 
not only because of the damage it does, but also because we cannot be confident enough about 
transcendental freedom to be confident that self-retribution is warranted.  This empirical work 
suggests that agents who succeed in resisting self-retribution can empathize without the threat of 
depression and the damage it does to rational agency.   
   
V. Potential Objections and Replies  
In this section I will address potential objections: first, an objection about perfect and 
imperfect duties; second, an objection about wrongs which do not cause pain; third, an objection 
about duties to ourselves; and fourth, an objection about wrongdoers’ sympathy with the desires 
of the wronged for wrongdoers to feel self-retributive remorse.  
First, it may be objected that by proposing to ground remorse in the duties of sympathy 
and friendship, I am associating it with imperfect duties which grant us latitude (see e.g. MM 
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6:392, 6:411) and are thus not suited to guide conscience.  The worry is that while we think 
sympathetic suffering reflects well upon someone's moral character, we may not think its 
absence in particular cases is a flaw, while remorse is something we expect of people who have 
wronged someone.  As Kant puts it, "I approve of a pain of compassion [Mittleids], but demand a 
pain of remorse [Reue]" (HN 19:178, Reflexionen 6848).  There are puzzles about conscience 
and the distinction between perfect and imperfect duty which I cannot address here, but Kant is 
clear that human beings should cultivate conscience in such a way that it "[holds their] duty 
before [them] for [their] acquittal or condemnation in every case that comes under a law" (MM 
6:400).23  Beyond avoidance of micrological conscience, we ought not pick and choose what we 
are conscientious about.  So it is important to emphasize that the sympathetic remorse proposed 
here is not meant to have the latitude of the general duty of sympathy.  The proposal is that 
conscience can respond to all our wrongs with sympathetic remorse.  Since sympathetic remorse 
involves rational sympathy, it is guided by practical reason just as Kant’s self-retributive remorse 
is, and is thus governed by the same criteria for identifying wrongs. 
The second objection to be considered is that not all wrongs cause pain.  Consider a case 
in which my friend requests that I kill him because of a painful terminal illness that will afflict 
him for many more years if he waits to die naturally.  Suppose I establish with certainty that the 
course of his illness is as he says, and his request is the result of thorough and stable reflection, 
and I kill him.  According to the letter of Kantian principles, I have done a grave wrong in acting 
in a way that subordinates his dignity as a rational agent to his pain.  But my action has ended his 
pain, so there is no actual pain with which to sympathize.  It may thus appear that there is no 
basis for remorse in this case on the model proposed here.  Such cases are of course challenging 
 
23 See Timmermann (2006) for a helpful discussion of conscience and the distinction between 
perfect and imperfect duty. 
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not only for the account of sympathetic remorse presented here, but also for Kantian ethics in 
general, as many who endorse the conception of Kantian rational dignity in most circumstances 
think it can sometimes be outweighed by profound suffering.  So we might respond to this 
objection by adopting a moral theory which is Kantian in many respects but holds that we need 
not feel remorse for such a killing because it is not wrong.   
Kant’s texts offer material for a more orthodox response, however.  As explained earlier, 
Kantian sympathy is a function of the imagination, and we can imaginatively transpose ourselves 
into the position of both actual and possible others.  Further, a passage in the Friedländer 
Anthropology notes mentioned above indicates that rational sympathy sometimes requires us to 
sympathize with possible versions of actual persons, versions who are as the actual people 
would be if they had vivid feelings of their dignity as rational agents.  The passage reads as 
follows:  
if people…subordinate to the aristocracy…are constantly under oppression, then 
they lose the idea of the right of humanity, for since they have no examples where 
justice prevails, then they think it must be so. There we must sympathize with the 
other’s right, but not with the physical ill[.] (FA 25:606) 
 
Suppose I treat someone disrespectfully who has been disrespected for so long that he has 
become inured to it.  Where is the pain with which I should sympathize?  Kant’s claim is that I 
must imagine myself into a version of the other's position adjusted in light of how he would feel 
if he had not lost the idea of the right of humanity.  He would be pained by my treatment of him, 
and by the way I contributed to denying him access to the kinds of experiences he could have as 
a member of a society free from oppression.   
 This strategy of sympathy with normatively-adjusted possible versions of actual others 
can be generalized to all wrongs which do not actually cause pain.  This should not seem ad hoc, 
since it is essential to Kant’s theory of rational sympathy that it is imaginative activity regulated 
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by the moral law and the concept of rational agency at its basis.  Consider euthanasia again.  An 
agent with a vivid sense of Kantian dignity would not wish to be killed, no matter how intense 
and protracted his pain, and would experience a kind of sublime joy in contemplating victory 
over his desire to die, motivated by his sense of dignity as a rational agent.  Though my friend 
does not actually feel this joy, it is the loss of this possible joy which provides the feeling-basis 
for my sympathetic remorse if I kill him.  If I fail in an attempt to kill him, I can sympathize with 
the possible joy he would have lost had I been successful.  Such sympathetic imaginings quickly 
become modally complex, but it seems reasonable to assume that the Kantian imagination has 
the capacity to handle such complexity.  
 The third objection is that sympathy cannot be the basis of remorse for violating duties to 
ourselves, because sympathy is something we feel for others.  But we can extrapolate from 
Kant’s idea that we project ourselves into possible versions of others and suppose that we can 
also project into possible versions of ourselves.  Imagine that Maria fails in her suicide attempt, 
and feels nothing but frustration at her failure.  Where is the basis for remorse over her failed 
attempt?  As in the euthanasia case, she can sympathize with the feelings she would have if she 
had a vivid appreciation of her dignity as a rational agent, and the sublime joy she could find in 
persisting despite her sorrow, and the loss of that possible joy she would have caused herself.  
Such care for this version of herself seems more likely to help her persist than a new infliction of 
the self-retribution Kant’s own account of remorse prescribes.   
The fourth objection is that part of the pain felt by others I have wronged may be bound 
up with the desire that I exact self-retributive remorse upon myself.  I argued earlier that the need 
of the wronged for the wrongdoer to have a painful emotional experience of the wrong is not 
always well-understood as retributive.  But what about cases where it is?  In such cases, 
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sympathetically putting myself in others’ places too completely might yield vicarious self-
retribution with consequences like those of exacting self-retributive remorse upon myself.  But 
here too, we can project ourselves into the perspectives others ought to take: if others ought not 
wish self-retribution upon us, then we should sympathize with the feelings they would have if 
they did not.  The reasons that we should experience sympathetic rather than self-retributive 
remorse ourselves imply a similar attitude toward others: we ought to demand sympathetic rather 
than self-retributive remorse of others.  This is a view Kant himself should support.  He holds 
that we have a duty of forgiveness (MM 6:460-1), and adopting this attitude toward others is a 
way of being forgiving.  When we put ourselves into the position of others who adopt this 
attitude, this is a way of extending forgiveness to ourselves in turn. 
This is the first step toward extending the attitude toward oneself advocated in this paper 
into a broader Kantian moral psychology which is non-retributive interpersonally as well as 
intrapersonally.  To be sure, Kant himself wants to offer an interpersonal moral psychology 
which is non-retributive in important ways.  We can see this in his critique of antipathy 
(Antipathie) (FA 607-611), which he also calls Schadenfreude (MM 6:459, CE 27:440, VE 27: 
695).  Schadenfreude is an activity of the imagination (MM 6:460) which inverts the function of 
sympathetic participation such that “one suffers pain because the other rejoices” and “one has a 
sensation of joy because the other has pain” (FA 25:607).  Kant calls it “diabolical”, and says 
that in its most extreme form, it is “an ideal, or a maximum of moral evil” (FA 25:608). 
Kant’s discussion of Schadenfreude in the Metaphysics of Morals comes directly after his 
discussion of sympathy.  He says that Schadenfreude is “directly opposed to one's duty in 
accordance with the principle of sympathy” (MM 6:459-60).  He specifies that “[t]he sweetest 
form of Schadenfreude is the desire for revenge” (MM 6:460), and goes on to argue that “[i]t is 
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therefore a duty of human beings to be forgiving” (MM 6:461).24  The course of this argument 
implies that the duty of sympathy extends to people who have wronged us, and that it is (at least 
in part) because of this that we have duty to be forgiving rather than vengeful.  But as we have 
seen, on Kant’s account, remorse has a self-retributive dimension, and there is reason to think 
that this self-retributive dimension is well-understood as involving vengeance upon oneself.  
Kant thinks that conscience includes an aspect of ourselves which we represent as God.  Kant 
holds that God, in contrast to human beings, justly punishes out of vengeance (MM 6:460).  This 
suggests that we justly punish ourselves out of vengeance on his model.  The references to 
deserved self-torture we saw earlier at MM 6:394 and CO 11:334 also support this interpretation.   
If this is right, then to demand that wrongdoers feel remorse on Kant’s own model of 
remorse is to demand that wrongdoers take vengeance upon themselves.  That it is a mediated 
demand for vengeance does not make it any less a demand for vengeance, and it should therefore 
be recognized as a violation of the duties of sympathy and forgiveness by Kant’s own lights.  
Presumably demands for vengeance are such that the wronged are pleased by their satisfaction, 
and such pleasure is therefore an instance of Schadenfreude.  If the wronged instead demand 
rationally sympathetic remorse, then while this remains a demand that the wrongdoer feel pain, 
the pain demanded is merely the pain necessary to fulfill the wrongdoer’s own duty of sympathy, 
rather than a pain involving vengeance. This takes us some distance toward fulfilling the duty of 
forgiveness.  However, if the demand for the wrongdoer’s painful sympathy remains one whose 
satisfaction brings pleasure to the wronged, then it remains Schadenfreude even if it is no longer 
vengeance.  The conclusion to which we are drawn is that the only way to be truly forgiving is 
 
24 Kant thinks that there is not only a duty to sympathize but a need to sympathize (2C 5:34), and 
the same thing quite plausibly holds with respect to the duty to forgive—that is, while Kant does 
not comment on a need to forgive, contemporary psychology offers evidence which supports the 
view that such a need exists (Worthington 2006: 61-68). 
33 
 
for the wronged to be sympathetically pained by the wrongdoers’ sympathetic pain.  This 
reciprocity of sympathy would motivate the wronged to offer wrongdoers opportunities to make 
amends.  It would establish a harmony of wills which includes the wills of remorseful 
wrongdoers, and would contribute to reunification of the moral community.  It would take great 
efforts of conscience-cultivation for real people to conform to this moral psychology, but I think 
it has attractions which extend well beyond Kantian ethics.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
I have presented a non-retributive account of remorse as the first step toward a revisionist 
but textually-grounded non-retributive Kantian ethics.  But most of the ideas offered here can be 
incorporated into the interpretations of Kantians committed to retributivism.  Even if one holds 
that self-retributive remorse must play a role in Kantian ethics, one can give sympathetic remorse 
a role too, and suppose that agents who have acted wrongly should be sensitive to both.  Kantian 
ethics is often criticized for having a simplistic moral psychology which does not capture the 
complexity of moral experience, and while previous commentary has already done a lot to blunt 
this criticism, finding a role in Kantian ethics for a distinctive kind of remorse based on 
sympathy can contribute to this effort. 
 
Bibliography 
American Psychiatric Association. 2013. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Fifth Edition.  Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association Publishing. 
Baron, Marcia and Fahmy, Melissa Seymour. 2009. “Beneficence and Other Duties of Love”. In 
Hill, Thomas E., ed.  The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 211-
228. 
Batson, C. D., Early, S., Salvarani, G. (1997). “Perspective taking: imagining how another feels 




Decety, Jean, Jackson, Philip L., Brunet, Eric.  “The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Empathy”.  
In Farrow, Tom F.D. and Woodruff, Peter W.R., eds. Empathy and Mental Illness.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 240-260. 
Denis, Lara. 2000. “Kant's Cold Sage and the Sublimity of Apathy”. Kantian Review, 4:48-73. 
Fahmy, Seymour Melissa. 2009. Active Sympathetic Participation: Reconsidering Kant's Duty of 
Sympathy. Kantian Review 14 (1):31-52. 
---. 2010. “Kantian Practical Love”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3): 313-331. 
Freud, Sigmund. 1989.  Civilization and its Discontents.  New York: Norton, 1989. 
Ghorbani, Nima; Bing, Mark N.; Watson, P.J.; Davison, H. Kristl; LeBreton, Daniel L.  2003.  
"Individualist and collectivist values: evidence of compatibility in Iran and the United 
States". Personality and Individual Differences 35 (2003):431–447. 
Guyer, Paul. 2010. “Moral feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals”. In Denis, Lara, ed. Kant's 
Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Halpern, Jodi. 2001. From Detached Concern to Empathy: Humanizing Medical Practice. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hill, Thomas E. 2002. Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives. Oxford 
University Press. 
Hodges, Sara D. and Biswas-Diener, Robert.  “Balancing the Empathy Expense Account: 
Strategies for Regulating Empathic Response”. In Farrow, Tom F.D. and Woodruff, 
Peter W.R., eds. Empathy and Mental Illness.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 390-407. 
Mill, John Stuart. 2001 (1863). Utilitarianism. Ed. George Sher. Indianapolis: Hackett.   
Murphy, Jeffrie G. 2012. Punishment and the Moral Emotions: Essays in Law, Morality, and 
Religion.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
O’Connor, Lynn; Berry, Jack W.; Lewis, Thomas; Mulherin, Kathleen; Cristosomo, Patrice S.  
2007. “Empathy and Depression: The Moral System on Overdrive”. In Farrow, Tom F.D. 
and Woodruff, Peter W.R., eds. Empathy and Mental Illness.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 49-75. 
Paytas, Tyler. 2015. “Rational Beings with Emotional Needs: The Patient-Centered Grounds of 
Kant's Duty of Humanity”. History of Philosophy Quarterly 32 (4):353-376.  
Pereboom, Derk (2006). “Kant on Transcendental Freedom”. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 73 (3):537-567. 
Pereboom, Derk. 2014.  Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.  New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Proeve, Michael and Tudor, Steven. 2016. Remorse: Psychological and Jurisprudential 
Perspectives. New York: Routledge.  
Smith, Nick. 2016. “Dialectical Retributivism: Why Apologetic Offenders Deserve Reductions 
in Punishment Even Under Retributive Theories”. Philosophia 44:343–360 
35 
 
Tangney, J. P. 1991. “Moral affect: The good, the bad, and the ugly”. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 61, 598– 607. 
Thomason, Krista K. 2017. “A Good Enough Heart: Kant and the Cultivation of 
Emotions”. Kantian Review 22 (3):441-462. 
Timmermann, Jens. 2006. “Kant on Conscience, ‘Indirect’ Duty, and Moral Error.” International 
Philosophical Quarterly 46, 293–308.  
Um, Sungwoo. 2020. “Gratitude for Being”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):222-233. 
Walker, Nigel. 1980. Punishment, Danger, and Stigma: The Morality of Criminal Justice. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Ware, Owen. 2009. The Duty of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 79 (3): 671-698. 
Wood, Allen. 2008. Kantian Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Worthington, Everett L. J. Forgiveness and Reconciliation : Theory and Application. New York: 
Routledge, 2006. 
